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Previous research has revealed that financial development is an essential determinant of a 
country’s economic growth and stability. A more developed banking system promotes a 
country’s economic growth during normal periods (Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Levine, 2005; 
Ongena and Giannetti, 2009) and reduces economic volatility (Denizer et al., 2002; Easterly 
et al., 2000; Larrain, 2006; Raddatz, 2006).The positive effect on economic volatility 
operates by reducing firms’ dependence for investment on their internal funds and allows for 
a lower impact of real shocks on economic volatility. Only empirical evidence provided by 
Beck et al. (2006) questions the positive effect of financial development on economic 
volatility depending on the type of shock. They show, using country data, that financial 
development dampens the effect of real shocks but magnifies the effect of monetary shocks. 
The net effect would thus depend on the predominant type of shock. Previous research has 
also revealed that financial stability promotes economic growth, especially in countries with 
more developed banking systems (Kroszner et al., 2007; Dell’Ariccia et al., 2008). 
None of these previous papers have analyzed how banking stability impacts on economic 
volatility. What are the channels through which banking stability affects economic volatility? 
Does the influence of banking stability on economic volatility vary across countries 
depending on national characteristics? These are the research questions of this paper. We 
broaden the evidence and directly analyze the influence of banking stability on economic 
volatility after controlling for the influence of financial development. We also analyze the 
channels through which banking stability impacts on economic volatility, and how this 
influence varies across countries depending on countries’ bank market competition and bank-
firm relationships. 
Our empirical study uses industry-level data from 110 countries over the 1989-2008 period. 
As lower economic volatility also promotes banking stability, we extend the traditional setup 
of Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Claessens and Laeven (2003) to identify the causality 
running from banking stability to economic volatility. We focus on sectors especially 
dependent on external finance and with higher intangible intensity as they should suffer more 
the consequences of banking stability through the reduction of credit supply and changes in 




We examine two channels through which banking stability may affect economic volatility: 
the lending channel and the asset allocation channel. The lending channel refers to the 
volatility of the credit supply. Lower banking stability increases the volatility of funds 
available to firms from banks. In imperfect capital markets, firms cannot totally substitute 
banks’ funds if banks reduce credit supply so that debtors are obliged to reduce investment. 
In this scenario, greater volatility of credit supply can be expected to increase economic 
volatility. This lending effect on economic volatility would be more relevant in more 
financially-dependent industries and in more developed banking systems. The asset allocation 
channel is related to how higher bank risk-taking incentives affect firms’ risk-taking. The less 
risk-averse banks are, the less reluctant they are to accept riskier behavior by their debtors. 
Greater risk-taking behavior by firms promoted by less risk-averse behavior by banks can be 
expected to increase economic volatility. As changes in firms’ risk are more likely in 
industries that are more intense in intangible assets, we expect the asset allocation effect to be 
higher in these industries. Moreover, we expect the asset allocation effect to be greater in 
countries with better institutional quality. John et al. (2008) show that better investor 
protection in a country increases firms’ incentives to take risk and means that higher bank 
risk-taking incentives lead to higher risk taking by firms in these countries. 
Our paper also analyzes how the influence of banking stability on economic volatility varies 
across countries depending on bank market competition and bank-firm relationships. 
Specifically, we analyze how bank market competition, bank concentration, legal entry 
requirements into banking, and restrictions on bank ownership and control of non-financial 
firms shape the influence of banking stability on economic volatility through both the lending 
and asset allocation channels. In this analysis, we have to separate the impact of these 
national characteristics on the influence of banking stability on economic volatility from their 
direct influence on banking stability. 
We find that banking stability reduces the volatility of industry value added more in 
industries that have more external dependence and intangible intensity when they are located 
in countries with more developed financial systems and better investor protection. The results 
indicate that banking stability reduces economic volatility through both the lending channel 
and the asset allocation channel. We also find that banking stability helps reduce economic 
volatility more, through both channels, in countries with less bank market competition or 
close bank-firm relationships. The results are robust when we use alternative proxies for 
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banking stability, such us the existence of a banking crisis, or alternative methods to control 
for the endogeneity of banking stability. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief review of the related 
literature and discusses the hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data, methodology, and 
variables. Section 4 presents the empirical results and robustness checks and, finally, Section 
5 concludes. 
2. Theoretical Background and Hypotheses 
The banking literature highlights the importance of bank risk-taking incentives in the 
presence of a deposit insurance scheme and the negative effects of banking crises on 
economic growth (Kroszner et al., 2007; Dell’Ariccia et al., 2008).  The control of bank risk-
taking incentives has therefore become the main task of regulatory and supervisory 
authorities to avoid the negative real effects of banking crises, especially when increased 
bank competition erodes bank charter value and exacerbates bank risk-taking incentives 
induced by deposit insurance and other safety nets (Keeley, 1990). Our paper focuses on how 
banking stability impacts on economic volatility, and is related to several strands of literature. 
First, our paper is related to the literature analyzing the effect of banking crises on economic 
growth as banking crises are the clearest ex-post measure of low banking stability. Kroszner 
et al. (2007) and Dell’Ariccia et al. (2008) confirm that systemic banking crises reduce 
economic growth by reducing bank credit supply and that this negative real effect is stronger 
in more financially-dependent industries located in countries with more developed banking 
systems. Fernández et al. (2013b) show that banking crises diminish economic growth not 
only by reducing the credit supply but also by negatively affecting firms’ intangible 
investments, especially in countries with highly-developed institutions. These papers analyze 
the consequences of banking instability on economic growth but none of them focuses on the 
impact on economic volatility. 
Second, it is related to the literature analyzing the relationship between financial development 
and economic volatility. The most recent evidence indicates that greater banking 
development reduces economic volatility (Easterly et al., 2000; Denizer et al., 2002; Larrain, 
2006; Raddatz, 2006). Banking development reduces volatility because it helps firms facing 
net worth problems to obtain the necessary working capital to finance their operations. 
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Investment by firms would then be less dependent on internal funds and bank funding would 
help reduce the impact of real shocks on economic volatility. In this case, banking 
development should lead to a relatively larger reduction in volatility in more financially-
dependent industries. Moreover, if financial constraints are tighter during contractions so that 
borrowing is countercyclical, banking development would lead to an even greater reduction 
in economic volatility. Beck et al. (2006) confirm at country level that banking development 
dampens the impact of real shocks on economic volatility because it alleviates the cash-flow 
constraints of firms that depend on external financing. However, they argue that financial 
intermediaries magnify the effect of monetary shocks on economic volatility. They identify 
monetary shocks with shocks to banks’ balance sheets. The net effect of banking 
development on economic volatility is not unambiguous and will depend on the relative 
importance of real versus monetary shocks. Our paper is closely related to Beck et al. (2006) 
but we directly analyze the impact of banking stability on economic volatility and use 
industry data. We separate the effect of banking stability through the lending and asset 
allocation channels, control for reverse causality focusing on more financial dependent 
industries, and analyze the influence of country characteristics. 
Third, our paper is related to the extensive literature analyzing the influence of bank 
competition on economic growth and financial stability. Empirical evidence suggests that less 
bank competition in imperfect capital markets fosters economic growth by increasing banks’ 
incentives to invest in the acquisition of soft information by establishing close relationships 
with borrowers over time, facilitating the availability of credit and thereby reducing firms’ 
financial constraints (Petersen and Rajan, 1994, 1995; Cetorelli and Gambera, 2001).The 
influence of bank competition on financial stability has promoted an intense debate in the 
banking literature. The traditional “competition-fragility” view (Keeley, 1990) has been 
challenged by the “competition-stability” view (Boyd and De Nicolò, 2005). Recent evidence 
shows that the relationship between bank competition and financial stability varies across 
countries depending on bank regulation and financial development (Beck et al., 2013) and 
depending on whether country-level or bank-level measures of market power are used (Kick 
and Prieto, 2014). We provide new evidence in the context of this literature by analyzing how 
bank market competition and bank-firm relationships shape the influence of banking stability 
on economic volatility. 
6 
 
In this paper we merge these strands of literature and we directly analyze how banking 
stability impacts on economic volatility. We distinguish between two potential channels or 
effects of banking stability on economic volatility. First, a finance or lending channel 
associated with the volatility of bank credit supply. Higher bank volatility or a greater 
probability of shocks to banks’ balance sheets would increase the volatility of funds available 
to firms from banks. In imperfect capital markets, firms could not totally substitute banks’ 
funds when they are reduced so they would then be obliged to reduce investment, increasing 
growth volatility. This channel is similar to the effect of monetary shocks analyzed by Beck 
et al. (2006). We expect this to be more relevant for industries that are more dependent on 
external finance and located in countries with more developed banking systems. Our first 
hypothesis is: 
H1. Banking stability decreases economic volatility more in more financially- 
dependent industries in countries that have more developed banking systems (the 
lending channel). 
A second channel stems from the influence of banks’ risk-taking incentives on investment by 
firms. Banks are less (more) reluctant to accept riskier behavior by their debtors if they are 
less (more) risk averse. We refer to this effect as the asset allocation channel. We expect this 
effect to be more relevant for industries with more intangible assets in countries with better 
investor protection or institutional quality. Intangible assets are riskier and have less value 
when a firm is liquidated. So higher bank risk-taking incentives may have a greater impact on 
changes in firm’s risk-taking in industries that have a higher proportion of intangible assets. 
Institutional quality also affects the propagation of bank risk-taking incentives to its firms’ 
risk-taking. John et al. (2008) show that a country’s investor protection is positively related to 
firm’s risk-taking. Several reasons explain this positive relation. In countries with well-
developed institutions and good investor protection, insiders have lower private benefits in 
the firms that they control. Lower private benefits increase insiders’ incentives to take risk 
because lower private benefits will be lost if risky investments fail. Good-quality institutions 
also favor disperse ownership (La Porta et al., 2000) and disperse ownership leads to higher 




H2. Banking stability decreases economic volatility more in more intangible- 
intensive industries in countries that provide better investor protection (the asset 
allocation channel). 
Finally, we analyze if the influence of banking stability on economic volatility, through the 
lending and asset allocation channels, varies across countries depending on bank competition 
and bank-firm relationships. We use direct proxies for bank competition such as the Lerner 
index and the Boone indicator and indirect proxies such as bank market concentration and 
countries’ regulation on entry requirements into banking. We use the legal restrictions on 
bank ownership and control of non-financial firms to proxy for ownership relationships 
between banks and their debtors.  
Previous literature suggests that a non-competitive banking market has a beneficial effect by 
promoting lending relationships and providing funds for firms. Cetorelli and Gambera (2001) 
and Claessens and Laeven (2005) show that the lower the competition in the banking market, 
the higher the credit provided to firms that are more dependent on external finance. Close 
lending relationships between banks and firms create switching costs for borrowers when 
changing lenders (Petersen and Rajan, 1994, 1995; Cetorelli and Gambera, 2001). If the 
relationship bank goes bankrupt, some of its borrowers might be obliged to borrow from non-
relationship banks. These borrowers would face an adverse selection problem as non-
informed banks will prefer to allocate their funds to the better known, but less profitable, 
projects of relationship firms (Detragiache et al., 2000). The consequence is that lending 
relationships increase the impact of a given volatility of bank credit supply on economic 
volatility. Fernández et al. (2013a) show that sectors that depend on external finance where 
market power promotes higher (lower) growth during normal periods also suffer on average a 
higher (lower) reduction in growth during a systemic banking crisis. Their finding is 
consistent with bank market power enhancing lending relationships in normal times and the 
existence of switching costs for firms when changing lenders during a systemic banking 
crisis. In such cases, less competitive banking markets or closer bank-firm relationships 
would increase the impact of banking stability on economic volatility through the lending 
channel. 
Moreover, close relationships between banks and borrowers reduce adverse selection and 
moral hazard problems associated with firms’ investments and explain why some intangible 
assets may be financed with debt (Claessens and Laeven, 2003). We would thus expect close 
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relationships between banks and borrowers to increase the asset allocation effect of banking 
stability on economic volatility. The reason is that a higher proportion of firms’ intangible 
assets, promoted by close relationships, means that changes in bank’s risk- taking incentives 
are likely to induce more changes in firms’ risk-taking. Our third hypothesis is: 
H3. Less banking competition or more bank-firm relationships increase the lending 
and asset allocation effects of banking stability on economic volatility. 
 
3. Data, methodology, and variables 
3.1. Data 
We use industry-specific and country-specific data from a variety of sources. We use a total 
sample of 110 developed and developing countries over the 1989-2008 period and aggregate 
data over different time periods. We report results for a 5-years period (aggregated over the 
periods 1989-1993, 1994-1998; 1999-2003, and 2004-2008).1We collect industry-level data 
on annual real value added from the UNIDO Industrial Statistic Database (2013). This 
database contains information on 23 industrial sectors at the 2-digit ISIC disaggregation level 
for the 1963-2010 period. As we use real values, we use the Consumer Price Index (CPI) 
from International Financial Statistics of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to deflate 
the industrial value added. Therefore, all data are expressed in US dollars and in real prices. 
Country-level data on banking stability, financial development, and bank market competition 
and concentration come from the Global Financial Development Database (GFDD) collected 
by the World Bank. Proxies for regulatory variables come from the World Bank’s Bank 
Regulation and Supervision Database. Proxies for countries’ investor protection and 
institutional quality come from the World Bank Institute’s Governance Group and the 
Heritage Foundation. 
Our final sample is made up of an unbalanced panel for a maximum of 4,993 industry-year 
observations in 110 developed and developing countries during the 1989-2008 period. We 
                                                   
1Beck et al. (2006) apply the same procedure to analyze how the impact of financial development on growth 
volatility varies depending on real and monetary shocks. In further robustness tests we check that the results do 




exclude USA from the analysis because it is our benchmark in order to define an exogenous 
proxy for industry’s external dependence and intangible intensity. 
 
3.2. Methodology 
We run estimations using industry-level data on the volatility of value added as the dependent 
variable. We regress economic volatility on banking stability and control for banking 
development and other relevant factors. We extend the basic setup of Rajan and Zingales 
(1998) and Claessens and Laeven (2003) to control for reverse causality between banking 
stability and economic volatility. Thus, we focus on more financially-dependent industries to 
identify causality from financial to the real sector.2 Our basic model is: 
VOLATILITY_VAi,j,t= α0+ α1 ISHAREi,j + 
   + α2EDi*FDj,t 
+α3 BANKSTABj,t * EDi 
+θi,j + λi,t + φj,t + εi,j,t      [1] 
VOLATILITY_VAi,j,t is the relative standard deviation of real value added of industry i in 
country j for the t period. ISHAREi,j is the share of industry i in the total value added of 
country j at the first 5-year period (1989-1993, or first available sub-period). It aims to 
capture the possibility that a more developed or mature sector is systematically less volatile 
(Raddatz, 2006). EDi is the external dependence ratio of sector i. FDj,t is the development of 
the banking system of country j in period t. BANKSTABj,t is the proxy for banking stability 
in country j during period t.  
The interaction EDi*FDjt controls for the influence of banking development on economic 
volatility. Previous evidence shows that banking development reduces the impact of real 
shocks on economic volatility (Larrain, 2006; Raddatz, 2006; Beck et al., 2006). We interact 
banking development with the external dependence ratio of the industry to control for 
potential reverse causality between economic volatility and banking development. If 
                                                   
2This approach was initially applied by Rajan and Zingales (1998) and subsequently used by Cetorelli and 
Gambera (2001), Claessens and Laeven (2003), Fisman and Love (2003), and Braun and Larrain (2005) to 
investigate the effects of bank concentration, property rights, trade credit usage, and recessions, respectively, on 
industrial growth. Kroszner et al. (2007) and Dell’Ariccia et al. (2008) have applied this approach to study the 
real effects of banking crises. Raddatz (2006) used this setup to specifically analyze the influence of banking 
development on economic volatility. 
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industries that depend more on external finance benefit the most from banking development, 
we would expect to reduce the sensitivity of firms’ investment to internal funds more in 
industries that are more dependent on external finance. Thus, a negative coefficient for α2 
would indicate causality from banking development to economic volatility and would be 
consistent with previous evidence (Larrain, 2006; Raddatz, 2006, and Beck et al., 2006). 
The interaction BANKSTABj,t * EDi captures the influence of banking stability on economic 
growth after controlling for banking development. We interact banking stability with 
industries’ external dependence to control for potential reverse causality between banking 
stability and economic growth. As industries with greater dependence on external finance are 
more sensitive to banking shocks, we assume that α3captures causality running from banking 
stability to economic growth. Thus, a negative coefficient for α3 would indicate that banking 
stability reduces economic volatility. 
We include three specific effects: industry-country (θi,j), industry-period (λi,t), and country-
period (φj,t). The three sets of specific effects should control for most shocks affecting the 
volatility of industrial value added. The industry-country specific effect should control not 
only for characteristics that are specific to either an industry or a country, but also for 
characteristics that are specific to an industry located in a particular country, as long as these 
are persistent over time. These include, for instance, the effect of persistent differences in 
size, concentration, financial frictions, or government intervention and support, derived from 
different factor endowments, market size, or institutional characteristics that may generate 
different volatility of value added patterns across industries and countries.  The industry-
period specific effect controls for worldwide industry shocks. Finally, the country-period 
specific effect controls for aggregate country-specific shocks. This approach has the 
advantage that it avoids the need for the financial development, the measure of banking 
stability, and the variable to proxy industrial external dependence to enter the regression on 
their own. It allows us to focus only on the terms of their interaction. Moreover, inclusion of 
these specific effects is less likely to suffer from omitted variable bias or model specification 
than traditional regressions.3 
We extend the basic model to separate the lending and asset allocation effects. The exact 
specification is as follows: 
                                                   
3 Dell’Ariccia et al. (2008) use the same procedure to examine the effects of systemic banking crises on economic growth of industries with 
different levels of external financial dependence. 
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VOLATILITY_VAi,j,t= β0+ β1 ISHAREi,j + 
   + β2EDi*FDj,t 
+β3 BANKSTABj,t * EDi*FDj 
+β4 BANKSTABj,t * INTANi * LAWj 
+θi,j + λi,t + φj,t + εi,j,t      [2]                                        
      
Where INTANi is the intangible intensity of industry i. LAWj is our proxy for a country’s 
investor protection. 
We include two additional terms to analyze the channels through which banking stability 
impacts on economic volatility after controlling for banking development. These triple 
interaction terms are the main contribution of the paper. The first triple interaction term 
(BANKSTABj,t*EDi*FDj,t) captures the relevance of the lending channel to explain how 
banking stability impacts on the volatility of industrial value added. To identify the causality 
from banking stability to economic volatility, we interact BANKSTAB with the industry’s 
external dependence. Again, our premise is that banking stability has a greater effect on the 
availability of funding for industries that are more dependent on external finance. Therefore, 
lower economic volatility associated with more banking stability in more financially- 
dependent industries would indicate that at least part of the causality runs from banking 
stability to economic volatility. Moreover, a more developed banking system will increase the 
change in credit supply that is associated with a particular level of banking stability. For that 
reason, we include FDj,t as an additional interaction term to capture the relative importance of 
the lending channel on economic volatility. A negative coefficient β3would be consistent with 
our Hypothesis 1, i.e, with banking stability reducing economic volatility through the lending 
channel. 
We include a second interaction term: BANKSTABj,t * INTANi * LAWj. This triple interaction 
term should capture the impact of banking stability on economic volatility through the asset 
allocation channel.4 The interaction of banking stability with the industry’s intangible 
intensity aims to control for reverse causality between economic volatility and the asset 
allocation effect of banking stability. We would expect that industries with more intangible 
assets are the most sensitive to higher bank risk-taking incentives. We additionally include 
                                                   




the interaction with the country’s institutional quality because the ability of bank risk-taking 
incentives to really induce higher risk-taking by firms depends on the quality of the country’s 
institutions. John et al. (2008) show that better investment protection leads corporations to 
undertake riskier projects. It reduces corporate insiders’ private benefits and their incentives 
to behave prudently as lower private benefits will be lost if risky investments fail. It also 
allows for dispersed ownership structures that promote better risk diversification and, 
consequently, higher risk-taking by firms. Higher bank risk-taking incentives will therefore 
increase firms’ risk-taking more in countries with better investor protection. A negative 
coefficient of β4 would be consistent with our hypothesis 2 by suggesting that greater banking 
stability reduces economic volatility through the asset allocation channel, especially in more 
intangible intensive industries in countries with good investor protection. 
We also estimate model [2] separately in different sub-samples of countries depending on 
bank market competition, concentration, legal bank entry requirements, and restrictions on 
bank ownership and control of non-financial firms. 
The regressions are estimated using instrumental variables (IV) and ordinary least squares 
(OLS). We estimate standard errors clustered by industry and country to capture correlations 
of different industries affected by the same country-level characteristics. This correlation is 
captured by the industry-country dummies if the country-level effect is fixed, but we adopt a 
general approach following Petersen (2009). We do not make assumptions on the precise 
form of the dependence across standard errors and cluster them by two dimensions 
simultaneously (industry and country). 
The IV (Instrumental Variables) methodology allows us to focus on the influence of the 
exogenous component of our explanatory variables. We apply several procedures to control 
for their potential endogeneity.  Following Rajan and Zingales (1998), we use predetermined 
values of industry’s external dependence and intangible intensity. We use different 
instruments for banking stability and development in a country. There is evidence showing 
that bank regulation, competition, and market structure affects both banking stability and 
development (Keeley, 1990; Barth et al., 2004; Beck et al., 2013, among others). As we aim 
to analyze how these country variables shape the influence of banking stability on economic 
volatility, we need to isolate the exogenous component of banking stability and development. 
Otherwise, we would mix the direct influence of these country variables on banking stability 
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and development with their influence on the relationships between banking stability and 
economic volatility.  
Following the law and finance literature (La Porta et al., 2000; Barth et al., 2004), our 
instruments are the four legal origin dummy variables (English, French, German and 
Scandinavian) and time dummies. We check that the results do not change when we use as 
alternative instruments: 1) the initial values (in the sub-period 1989-1993, or first available) 
of, respectively, banking stability or financial development, and 2) when we add to the four 
legal origin dummy variables and time, three measures of banking sector regulation –
regulation on non-traditional banking activities, overall bank capital stringency, and legal 
entry requirements into the banking industry–; and an index measuring the institutional 
quality of the country (the rule of law). 
To test the suitability of our Instrumental Variables (IV) estimator, we perform the Durbin-
Wu-Hausman statistic test which verifies the null hypothesis that the introduction of IVs has 
no effect on estimates of the regression’s coefficients. We report IV estimations when the test 
is rejected at the 10 percent level or less. Otherwise, we report OLS estimates using the 
observed values of financial development and bank Z-score.5 
3.3. Variables 
3.3.1. Economic Volatility 
Our dependent variable is the relative standard deviation of real value added of each industry 
in each country. We compute the standard deviation of real value added in each industry 
following previous studies (Larrain, 2006; Raddatz, 2006; Beck et al., 2006). Additionally, 
we normalize the standard deviation by the average value added, as in Klomp and de Haan 
(2009), to obtain a relative standard deviation. This measure incorporates the effect of growth 
differences across industries with different levels of volatility and allows us to infer clearer 
implications in terms of welfare. Higher banking stability might reduce not only economic 
volatility but also economic growth because bank risk-taking may promote more risky and 
profitable investments by firms. Our relative standard deviation captures the effect of banking 
stability on economic volatility after taking into account growth differences. Our volatility 
indicator is:  
                                                   
5 The results of the first stage regressions are available from the authors upon request and the F-test confirms that the selected instruments 
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Where , ,  is the real value added of industry i in country j at time t.  , ,  is the average 
industrial real value added in a five-year period of industry i in country j over period . We 
calculate the relative standard deviation using annual data over a five-year period. We 
analyze the whole period of 1989-2008 and then aggregate data over the periods 1989-1993, 
1994-1998, 1999-2003, and 2004-2008. In our estimations, we use the natural logarithm of 
, , to make the dependent variablenormally distributed. We check the robustness of the 
results using the standard deviation of real value added (without dividing by growth), which 
is mostly used in previous studies. 
Table 1 shows the country mean values of the variables used in the empirical analysis. We 
observe that the countries with higher volatility of industrial value added over the whole 
period (1989-2008) are Central African Republic (1.8930), Côte d’Ivoire (0.8554), Niger 
(0.7209) and Iraq (0.4069). The countries with the lowest levels of industrial value added 
volatility are Pakistan (-1.8706), Switzerland (-1.6959), Paraguay (-1.6272) and Belarus (-
1.5939). Table 2 shows the mean values of the main variables by industrial sectors. The 
Leather industry presents the lowest volatility of value added. Industries like Coke, 
Petroleum, and Nuclear, or Office, Accounting, and Computing Machinery are the industries 
with the highest value added volatility. 
3.3.2. Banking Stability 
We use two main proxies for banking stability (BANKSTAB): The Z-score and the ratio of 
non-performing loans to total loans (NPL). The Z-score (ZSCORE) is a measure of bank 
insolvency risk. It is calculated at bank-level as the return on assets plus the capital-asset ratio 
divided by the standard deviation of asset returns. Specifically, ZSCORE = 
(ROA+CAR)/SDROA, where ROA is the rate of return on assets, CAR is the capital-asset 
ratio, and SDROA is an estimate of the standard deviation of the rate of return on assets. A 
higher Z-score indicates that the bank is more stable because it is inversely related with the 
probability of bank insolvency. Since the Z-score is highly skewed, we use the natural 
logarithm of Z-score, which is normally distributed. Laeven and Levine (2009), Houston et 
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al. (2010), Beck et al. (2013), among others, have recently used the Z-score as a proxy for 
bank insolvency risk.  
We also use the ratio of non-performing loans in a country as an alternative proxy for 
banking stability (NPL). This is a traditional ex-post measure of bank credit risk and is 
defined as the ratio of defaulting loans (payments of interest and principal past due date by 90 
days or more) to total gross loans.  
As we perform the empirical analysis at banking industry level, we use the aggregated value 
by country and period of both variables. To do this, we consider the measure of each variable 
at country-level provided by the World Bank’s GFDD. Country-level values are calculated, 
using information from Bankscope, as the weighted bank average of each variable. The 
weights are the participation of the bank assets in the total assets of the banking system.6In 
our sample, ZSCORE ranges from a minimum value of -0.1325 in Thailand to a maximum 
value of 3.0520 in Cyprus. Bangladesh presents the highest value in the ratio non-performing 
loans to gross loans (29.91%) and Luxembourg the lowest one (0.42%). 
3.3.3. Industries’ External Dependence and Intangible Intensity 
We measure external dependence for each industrial sector (ED) using the index calculated 
by Rajan and Zingales (1998) for a sample of US firms. This index is defined as the fraction 
of capital expenditure not financed with cash-flow from operations constructed at industry-
level. This approach offers a valid and exogenous way of identifying the extent of an 
industry’s external dependence anywhere in the world. An important assumption underlying 
it is that external dependence reflects technological characteristics of the industry that are 
relatively stable across space and time. Cetorelli and Gambera (2001), Claessens and Laeven 
(2003), Kroszner et al. (2007), and Dell’Ariccia et al. (2008), among others, have previously 
used this approach to proxy the exogenous component of industry’s external dependence. 
We follow a similar approach to only consider the exogenous component of industries’ 
intangible intensity. We use the benchmark data from Claessens and Laeven (2003) for our 
measure of intangible intensity. Like Rajan and Zingales (1998) with the exogenous 
component of industries’ external dependence, Claessens and Laeven (2003) assume that the 
intangible intensity for each industry in the US is a good benchmark for each industry across 
                                                   
6 As the World Bank does not provide aggregated data on bank Z-score and NPL before 1999, we directly aggregate at country level the 
bank Z-score and NPL estimated at individual level from Bankscope for the 1989-1999 period. We also use bank assets in the total assets of 
the banking system as weights to compute the Z-score and NPL at country level. 
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countries. They calculate intangible intensity as the ratio of intangible assets to net fixed 
assets using Compustat data on US firms for the years immediately before our analysis 
period, 1980-1989.7 
3.3.4. Country’s Banking Development 
We follow Rajan and Zingales (1998), Beck et al. (2000), and Kroszner et al. (2007), among 
others, and measure banking development (FD) as the ratio of private credit of deposit money 
banks to GDP taken from the World Bank Statistics Database. In our estimations, we focus 
on the exogenous component of countries’ banking development and use the fitted values of 
an OLS in which regulatory and institutional national characteristics are the explanatory 
variables. Switzerland (154%) and Hong Kong (142%) are the countries that present the 
highest levels of banking development. The lowest values of banking development are in Iraq 
(2.24%) and El Salvador (3.99%).  
3.3.5. Countries’ Institutional Quality 
We use the rule of law index (LAW) as a proxy for investor protection and institutional 
quality in a country. Higher values of this variable indicate higher efficiency in the 
application of laws. In our sample, the highest values for this variable are in Sweden, 
Norway, and New Zealand, among others. Countries like Cameroon or Algeria are the 
countries with the lowest levels of rule of law. We collected these data from The World Bank 
Institute’s Governance Group. We examine the robustness of our results to alternative 
proxies: (1) the Kaufman et al. (2001) KKZ index, which is calculated as the average of six 
indicators: voice and accountability in the political system; political stability; government 
effectiveness; regulatory quality; rule of law; and control of corruption. (2) the property rights 
index constructed by the Heritage Foundation, which ranges from 1 to 5, where higher values 
indicate greater protection of property rights. Results are not significantly different using 
these alternatives. 
3.3.6. Bank Competition, Concentration, and Ownership Relationships 
We use the Lerner index, the Boone indicator, and bank market concentration as proxies for 
bank market competition. All these proxies are inversely related to bank competition and are 
                                                   
7
We also check that the results do not change when we calculatean individual measure of intangible intensity for each industry in a specific 
country over the first period of our analysis (1989-1993), or first available, using firm-level data from Compustat. 
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obtained at country level from the GFDD. Original data come from Bankscope. The Lerner 
index (LERNER) is defined as the difference between output prices and marginal costs 
(relative to prices). Prices are calculated as total bank revenue over assets, whereas marginal 
costs are obtained from an estimated translog cost function with respect to output. The Lerner 
index takes 0 in the case of perfect competition and 1 under perfect monopoly. It has been 
widely and recently used in the banking sector as an indicator of the degree of market power 
(Beck et al., 2013). Table 1 shows that the Kyrgyz Rep. has the highest Lerner index over the 
1989-2008 period (0.9548) whereas Kenya has the lowest (0.0154). 
The Boone indicator (BOONE) is the elasticity of profits to marginal costs. To obtain the 
elasticity, the log of profits (measured by return on assets) is regressed on the log of marginal 
costs. The estimated coefficient is the elasticity. The rationale behind the indicator is that 
higher profits are achieved by more efficient banks. Hence, the more negative the Boone 
indicator is, the higher the degree of competition because the effect of reallocation is 
stronger. Estimations of the Boone indicator in the World Bank’s database follow the 
methodology used by Schaeck and Čihák (2010) with a modification to use marginal costs 
instead of average costs. In our sample of countries, the Boone indicator has its highest value 
in Korea (2.2074) whereas Barbados has the lowest value (-2.0520). 
Bank concentration (CONC) is defined as the ratio of the assets of the three largest 
commercial banks to total commercial banking assets in a country. Table 1 shows that Belize, 
Gabon, Iceland, New Zealand, Saint Lucia, Swaziland, and Tanzania present the highest 
values for bank concentration (100%). The least concentrated banking markets are in 
Luxembourg (27.79%), Panama (32.19%), or Japan (32.52%). 
We also analyze the influence of two regulatory variables: legal restrictions to entry into the 
banking industry (ENTRY) and restrictions on the mixing of banking and commerce 
(RESTOWN).These regulatory variables come from the World Bank’s Bank Regulation and 
Supervision database (Barth et al., 2006). ENTRY is based on whether or not the following 
information is required: (1) draft by-laws; (2) intended organizational chart; (3) financial 
projections for first 3 years; (4) financial information on main potential shareholders; (5) 
background/experience of future directors; (6) background/experience of future managers; (7) 
sources of funds to be used to capitalize the new bank; and (8) market differentiation 
intended for the new bank. Each type of information is assigned a value of 1 if it is required 
and 0 otherwise. Thus, higher values of this variable indicate stronger barriers to entry into 
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the banking industry. In our sample ENTRY ranges from a minimum value of 3 to a 
maximum value of 8. 
RESTOWN is a proxy for ownership relationships between banks and their debtors. It 
indicates whether bank ownership and control of non-financial firms are: (1) unrestricted, (2) 
permitted, (3) restricted, or (4) prohibited. This variable ranges from a minimum value of 1 
(Brazil, Netherlands or New Zealand, among others) to a maximum value of 4 (Bolivia, 
China or Singapore, among others). Higher values of RESTOWN indicate more restrictions 
and thus fewer potential bank-firm relationships.  
INSERT TABLE 1 AND TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
Table 3 shows the correlation matrix. We observe negative and significant relationships 
between the volatility of value added and FDj,t, and between the industrial volatility and the 
ZSCOREj,t. Moreover, the correlation between economic volatility and NPLj,t is positive and 
statistically significant. These results suggest that the higher the banking development and the 
higher the stability of the banking system, the lower the volatility of industrial value added. 
The relationship between industrial volatility and the measure of institutional quality (LAWj) 
is negative and statistically significant, suggesting that higher levels of institutional quality in 
a country have positive effects on the stability of industrial economic performance. BOONEj,t 
correlates negatively to economic volatility, while the correlation with CONCj,t is positive 
and statistically significant. The volatility of industrial value added presents a positive 
relationship with the legal restrictions on banks’ participation in the ownership and control of 
non-financial firms (RESTOWNj,t), indicating that the greater the prohibition  banks to 
participate in the capital of non-financial firms, the higher the economic volatility. The 
Lerner index (LERNERj,t) and the index of legal entry requirements into the banking industry 
(ENTRYj,t) present negative, although not statistically significant at conventional levels, 
correlations with the measure of industrial volatility. 





4. Empirical Results 
4.1. Banking Stability, Financial Development, and Economic Volatility 
We now present the results for our basic model [1] explaining (1) how banking stability 
affects the volatility of industrial value added after controlling for financial development; and 
(2) the channels through which banking stability affects economic volatility. The results are 
reported in Table 4.We use the Z-score as proxy for banking stability in columns (2)-(5) and 
the ratio of non-performing loans in columns (6)-(9). ISHARE has negative and significant 
coefficients in all the estimations. It indicates that relatively larger sectors are less volatile. 
The negative and significant coefficient of EDi*FDj,t in column (1) indicates that industries 
with higher levels of financial dependence tend to have lower levels of volatility of value 
added in countries with more developed financial systems. This result is consistent with 
previous findings by Larrain (2006), Raddatz (2006), and Beck et al. (2006). It suggests that 
greater availability of credit to sectors with more financial needs in countries with more 
developed banking systems helps stabilize industrial value added. It confirms that financial 
development reduces firms’ dependence for investment on their internal funds and reduces 
the impact of real shocks on industry value added volatility. 
In columns (2) and (6) we analyze the direct effect of banking stability on the volatility of 
industry value added. We obtain a negative and significant coefficient for the interaction term 
BANKSTABj,t*EDi when we use ZSCORE as proxy for banking stability and a positive 
coefficient when we use NPL in column (6). These coefficients indicate that higher banking 
stability is associated with lower volatility of industrial value added. Results remain invariant 
in columns (3) and (7) where we jointly consider the effect of both banking development and 
stability on industrial economic volatility. This result suggests that banking stability reduces 
economic volatility after controlling for banking development. However, it does not provide 
us with information on the channels through which this influence operates. 
We examine in columns (4)-(5) and (8)-(9) the channels through which higher banking 
stability reduces volatility of industrial value added. To do this, we focus on the coefficients 
of two interaction terms: BANKSTABj,t*EDi*FDj,t captures the impact of banking stability on 
economic volatility through its impact on credit supply; and BANKSTABj,t*INTANi*LAWj 
focuses on the effect through the asset allocation channel. 
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We obtain negative and significant coefficients of the interaction BANKSTABj,t* EDi*FDj,t 
when the Z-score is the proxy for banking stability, and positive ones when we use the NPL 
in columns (8)-(9). These results are consistent with our first hypothesis and the relevance of 
the lending channel, i.e., banking stability reduces economic volatility by diminishing the 
volatility of the credit supply, especially in industries that are more dependent on external 
finance and in more developed banking systems. The interaction term 
BANKSTABj,t*INTANi*LAWj has negative and significant coefficients in columns (4)-(5), and 
positive ones when we use NPL as a proxy for banking stability in columns (8)-(9). This 
result is consistent with our second hypothesis and the relevance of the asset allocation 
channel. Banking stability reduces economic volatility, especially in more intangible 
intensive industries and in countries with better investor protection. 
Both the finance and the asset allocation effects are economically significant. Using, for 
instance, the result in column (5), a standard deviation increase in the Z-score of the national 
banking system would reduce the volatility of value added in an industry at the 75th percentile 
of external dependence and located in a country at the 75th percentile of financial 
development by 33 times more than in an industry at the 25th percentile of external 
dependence and located in a country at the 25th percentile of financial development. 
Also using column (5) to estimate the economic impact of the asset allocation effect, an 
industry at the 75th percentile of intangible intensity and located in a country at the 75th 
percentile of investor protection experiences a 3.8 times greater reduction in the volatility of 
value added when there is an increase of one standard deviation in the banks’ Z-score than in 
industries at the 25th percentile of intangible intensity and located at the 25th percentile of 
investor protection. 
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
4.2. Influence of Bank Market Competition and Ownership Relationships 
We now analyze whether the influence of banking stability on economic volatility, through 
both the lending channel and the asset allocation channel, varies across countries depending 
on bank market competition and ownership relationships between banks and non-financial 
firms. Specifically, we test how bank market power (LERNER and BOONE), concentration 
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(CONC), legal entry requirements into banking (ENTRY), and legal restrictions on bank 
ownership and control of non-financial firms (RESTOWN) shape the influence of the lending 
and asset allocation channels on economic volatility.  We split the sample of industry-country 
observations around the median of each country variable. The results are reported in Table 5. 
Panel A shows the results when we use the Z-score as the proxy for banking stability whereas 
in Panel B we use NPL as the proxy inversely related to banking stability. 
In the first four columns of both panels, we use the Lerner and Boone indexes to examine 
how bank market power affects the impact of banking stability on economic volatility. The 
results indicate that banking stability reduces economic volatility more in countries that have 
higher bank market power. The coefficients of both triple interaction terms 
(ZSCOREj,t*EDi*FDj,t and ZSCOREj,t*INTANi*LAWj) are significant in countries with a 
Lerner or Boone indicator above the median of the sample in columns (1) and (3). The 
significant coefficients are negative when we use the banks’ Z-score (Panel A) and positive 
when we use the ratio of non-performing loans (Panel B) as the proxy for banking stability. 
These results indicate the relevance of the lending and asset allocation effects of banking 
stability on economic volatility in countries with relatively high bank market power. 
However, in countries with a Lerner and Boone indicator below the median in the sample, the 
coefficients of the triple interaction terms are not significant or less significant. In Panel A, 
using the Z-score as the proxy for banking stability, we do not obtain significant coefficients 
for ZSCOREj,t*EDi*FDj,t in columns (2) or (4), suggesting that banking stability does not 
reduce economic volatility by diminishing the volatility of credit supply in countries with a 
bank market power below the median of the sample. The coefficient of 
ZSCOREj,t*INTANi*LAWj is significant in column (4) but not in column (2).  In Panel B, none 
of the coefficients of the two triple interaction terms are significant in countries with a bank 
market power below the median when we use the Lerner index as the proxy for bank market 
power in column (2). We only obtain the expected positive coefficient of the interaction 
NPLj,t*EDi *FDj,t when we use the Boone indicator as the proxy for banking stability. 
We obtain similar results when we use CONC and ENTRY as indirect proxies, inversely 
related, to bank market competition in columns (5) to (8). In countries with bank 
concentration or bank entry requirements above the median, we obtain negative and 
significant coefficients for both triple interaction terms in Panel A and positive coefficients in 
Panel B. However, in the sub-sample of countries with bank concentration or bank entry 
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requirements below the median, we do not obtain significant coefficients for the triple 
interaction terms capturing the lending effect, and only the triple interaction term capturing 
the asset allocation effect has significant coefficients. 
These results of our proxies for bank market competition support hypothesis 3 because they 
suggest that greater bank market power or less banking competition increase both the lending 
and asset allocation effects of banking stability on economic volatility. This finding is 
consistent with bank market power enhancing lending relationships between banks and 
industrial firms that originate switching costs for firms and influence  investment by firms in 
case of banks’ balance-sheet shocks (the lending effect). Moreover, if greater bank market 
power and close lending relationships facilitate bank funding for intangible assets, greater 
market power could also explain a higher impact of bank stability on economic volatility 
through the asset allocation channel. 
The evidence is weaker when we focus on the influence of ownership relationships between 
banks and industrial firms. We do not find significant differences in the lending channel 
effect across countries depending on countries’ legal restrictions on bank ownership and 
control of non-financial firms (RESTOWN). The coefficients of the interaction term 
ZSCOREj,t*EDi*FDj,t, are negative in both columns (9) and (10). Similarly, the coefficients 
of ZSCOREj,t*EDi*FDj,t are positive in both columns of Panel B. We only find differences in 
the asset allocation effect of bank stability in Panel B when we use NPL as the proxy for 
banking stability. The coefficient of ZSCOREj,t*INTANi*LAWjis positive and significant in 
column (10) but not in column (9). It indicates that bank incentives impact on risk-taking by 
firms only in countries with lower restrictions on bank ownership of non-financial firms. 
Mixing banking and commerce increases the impact of banking stability on economic 
volatility through the asset allocation effect. It is consistent with bank risk-taking incentives 
affecting risk-taking by firms more if banks can have equity stakes in firms. 
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
4.3. Systemic Banking Crises and Economic Volatility 
We now empirically analyze the influence of a systemic banking crisis on the volatility of 
industrial value added. Systemic banking crises can be considered an ex-post measure of 
banking instability in a country and we use it as an alternative proxy to Z-score and NPL for 
banking stability. Obviously, banking crises would be inversely related to bank stability. 
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Using the information on financial crises provided by the Laeven and Valencia (2012) 
database, we identify a total of 71 episodes of systemic and borderline banking crises 
occurred in 66 developed and developing countries over the global sample period 1989-
2008.We check that results do not change when only systemic banking crises are considered 
and when we omit information about the recent crisis. Information on banking crisis 
inception dates is provided in Table 1. 
Results are reported in Table 6. In Panel A, we define a crisis dummy variable (CRISIS) that 
takes value 1 in the period in which the country has experienced a systemic or borderline 
banking crisis and the following periods. CRISIS takes value 0 when a country has not 
experienced a banking crisis or in the periods before a systemic banking crisis if the country 
has experienced one. In Panel B, we define CRISIS as a dummy variable that takes value 1 in 
the period in which the country has experienced a banking crisis, and 0 otherwise. 
The results are consistent with those reported in Table 4presented in the above sections. We 
obtain a negative and significant coefficient for the interaction term EDi*FDj,t in all the 
estimations, indicating that industries with higher levels of financial dependence tend to have 
lower levels of volatility of value added in countries with more developed financial systems. 
The coefficient of the interaction CRISISj,t*EDi is positive and statistically significant and 
suggests that the volatility of value added in industries that depend more on external finance 
is higher in countries experiencing an episode of banking distress. The result is consistent 
with that obtained by Dell’Ariccia et al. (2008). These authors show that banking crises have 
a more negative effect on economic growth in industries that are most in need of external 
finance. We now show that this kind of industry suffers most from the negative consequences 
of a crisis in terms of lower stability of value added. 
In columns (2)-(4) and (6)-(8) we look at the channels through which banking crises affect 
the volatility of industrial value added. We obtain a positive and statistically significant 
coefficient for the triple interaction term CRISISj,t * EDi*FDj,t in all the estimations. It 
indicates that crisis periods affect the economic volatility of more financially-dependent 
industries more positively in countries with higher levels of financial development. The result 
is consistent with that presented in Table 4 for the bank Z-score. According to Kroszner et al. 
(2007), if industries that depend more on external finance are hurt more severely after a 
banking crisis, then a banking crisis is likely to have an independent negative effect on real 
economic activity. Following this reasoning, operating in an environment where the banking 
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market is well-developed is an advantage for more financially-dependent industries in good 
times, but a disadvantage (in terms of higher economic volatility) in times of banking crises. 
In terms of the asset allocation channel, we obtain a positive coefficient for the interactive 
term CRISISj,t*INTANi*LAWj in all the estimations. This result is consistent with previous 
results and suggests that crisis periods increase the economic volatility of industries more if 
they are more intensive in intangible assets and are in countries with higher institutional 
quality. 
INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
 
4.4. Robustness Checks 
We now compare our approach with the previous literature analyzing how banking 
development influences economic volatility. The most related paper is Beck et al. (2006) 
analyzing whether banking development magnifies or dampens real and monetary shocks. 
They associate monetary shocks with impacts on banks’ balance sheets. So their monetary 
shocks would be similar to our lending effect of banking stability because both of them affect 
economic volatility through changes in credit supply. They do not consider the asset 
allocation effect of banking stability and do not use direct measures of banking stability. 
Their model specification using country data is: 
SD_GROWTHj,t= α0 +a1SD_ΔTOTj,t + α2SD_INFj,t + α3FDj,t + α4FDj,t* SD_ΔTOTj,t + 
+α5 FDj,t* SD_INFj ,t + εj,t   
[2] 
The dependent variable is the standard deviation of real per capita GDP of country j in period 
t, calculated over three-year periods (SD_GROWTHj,t). SD_ΔTOTj,t is the standard deviation 
of  trade changes. Terms of trade volatility attempts to capture changes in the terms of trade 
associated with changes in input prices or technologies affecting the production function, 
which in turn lead to changes in the level of productivity of the economy. SD_INFj,t is the 
standard deviation of  inflation. Monetary volatility refers to changes in monetary policies 
affecting interest rates, credit supply to the private sector and, therefore, economic 
performance. FDj,t is the proxy for financial development in a country. 
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We use their variables for real and monetary shocks in our sample of industrial data and 
control for our industry, country, and period effects. SD_ΔTOTi,j,t and SD_INFi,j,t are 
calculated for our periods of analysis using data from the World Development Indicators 
(WDI)database. In column (1) of Table 7, we simply replicate the basic model of Beck et al. 
(2006). We confirm their finding that financial development dampens the impact of real 
shocks (the coefficient of SD_ΔTOTi,j,t*FD is negative) but magnifies the impact of monetary 
shocks (the coefficient of SD_INFi,j,t*FDj,t is positive). In column (2) we only include 
ISHARE and country-industry, country-year, and industry-year fixed effects as control 
variables. The influence of banking development in reducing the impact of real shocks and 
increasing the impact of monetary shocks on economic volatility does not change. It is 
consistent with our fixed effects controlling for differences across countries on banking 
development and real and monetary shocks, which allows us to focus on the interaction 
terms. The results in columns (3) and (4) show additional robustness checks of these results. 
Columns (5) to (7) test the relevance of the lending and asset allocation channels using 
similar proxies for real and monetary shocks and set-up to those used by Beck et al. (2006). 
In these columns, we extend their model to incorporate our controls for reverse causality 
(interactions with ED) and the asset allocation effect of banking stability. The positive 
coefficients SD_INFi,j,t*EDi*FDj,t and SD_INFi,j,t*INTANi*LAWj in column (5) confirm, 
respectively, the relevance of the lending and asset allocation effects as channels through 
which banking stability reduces the volatility of industry value added. The results are similar 
in column (7) when we use the interaction term SD_ΔTOTi,j,t*EDi*FDj,t instead of EDi*FDj,t 
to control for the influence of banking development in reducing the impact of real shocks on 
economic volatility. 
In a further analysis, we make additional checks for the robustness of the results. First, we 
check that the results are robust to alternative definitions of the set of instruments for the 
interaction terms of banking stability and financial development. For instance, we check that 
results do not vary when we use additional institutional variables as instruments, such as an 
index measuring the quality of protection of property rights and the KKZ index. Following 
Claessens and Laeven (2003), we use the rating of protection of property rights constructed 
by the Heritage Foundation. It ranges from 1 to 5, where higher values indicate greater 
protection of property rights. We also introduce the KKZ index calculated as the average 
value of the six indicators of governance provided by The World Bank Institute’s 
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Governance Group: Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of Violence, 
Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption 
(Kaufman et al., 2001). Second, we also consider the provisions for problematic loans to total 
gross loans as an alternative proxy for banking stability. The results obtained are similar to 
those reported.8 
5. Conclusions 
Previous banking literature has documented the positive role of financial development for 
fostering stability in the real economic sector. We provide additional empirical evidence on 
the relevance of the financial sector for promoting lower levels of economic volatility. In 
particular, we examine the impact of banking stability on the volatility of industrial value 
added in 23 industrial sectors located in 110 developed and developing countries over the 
1989-2008 period. We control for financial development, endogeneity of banking stability, 
and reverse causality problems between banking stability and volatility of industrial value 
added. Our results indicate that banking stability reduces the volatility of industrial value 
added through two channels: the lending channel and the asset allocation channel.  
Banking instability increases the volatility of credit supply. In imperfect capital markets, 
firms cannot totally substitute banks’ funds if banks reduce credit supply so that debtors are 
obliged to reduce investment. In this situation, higher volatility of credit supply would 
increase economic volatility through the lending effect. This lending effect is more relevant 
in industries with more external financial needs in countries with more developed banking 
markets. 
The asset allocation effect is related to the effect of higher bank risk-taking incentives on 
firms’ risk-taking. The less risk-averse banks are, the less reluctant they are to accept riskier 
behavior by their debtors. This higher risk-taking behavior by firms promoted by less risk-
averse behavior by banks would increase economic volatility. Our results highlight that 
banking stability promotes economic volatility in industries that are more intensive in 
intangible assets and in countries with higher institutional quality. Higher quality of 
institutions increases firms’ incentives to take risk and may explain why bank risk fosters 
greater risk-taking by firms in these countries. 
                                                   
8 All the robustness tests are available from the authors upon request. 
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The effect of banking stability on economic volatility through the two channels varies across 
countries depending on bank market competition and bank-firm relationships. We find that 
banking stability contributes more to reducing the volatility of industrial value added in 
countries with higher bank market power, higher bank concentration, stricter restrictions on 
bank entry and fewer legal restrictions on bank ownership of non-financial firms. 
Our results have some policy implications. If economies intend to increase growth rates by 
promoting innovation and investment in intangible assets, it will be increasingly important to 
avoid banking instability as this would be increasingly harmful for real economic stability. 
Moreover, our results highlight that bank market competition and bank-firm relationship not 
only influences banking stability, as the literature has extensively shown, but also the impact 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics. Country-Level Information 
 
This table shows the mean values of the main variables by country and the information about the inception dates of the 71 crisis episodes that occurred during the 1989-2008 
period. Volatility VA is the standard deviation (relative) of the industrial value added (in natural logarithms).  FD is a measure of financial development and is defined as the 
ratio of bank private credit from commercial banks-to-GDP. ZSCORE is the natural logarithm of bank Z-score, a proxy for insolvency risk that equals the return on assets plus 
the capital asset ratio divided by the standard deviation of asset returns. NPL is the percentage of non-performing loans over total gross loans. LAW is the rule of law index.  
LERNER is the Lerner index. BOONE is the Boone indicator. LERNER and BOONE are proxies for bank market power. CONC is bank concentration, measured as the 
fraction of the assets of the three largest banks as a share of the assets of all commercial banks in a country. ENTRY is an index that measures the legal restrictions to entry 
into the banking industry. RESTOWN measures the legal restrictions on bank ownership and control by non-financial firms. The sample consists of 110 developed and 
developing countries during the 1989 – 2008 period. Industrial information comes from the UNIDO database. Country-level financial information is collected from the World 
Bank Statistics Database. Information on institutional variables is from The World Bank Institute’s Governance Group.  Regulatory variables come from the Barth et al. 








FD (%) ZSCORE NPL(%) LAW LERNER BOONE CONC ENTRY RESTOWN 
Albania 1994 -1.0310 8.9761 1.0814 4.2600 -0.1171 0.1433 -0.0746 96.4009 8 3 
Algeria 1990 -0.9967 14.8732 1.0987 n.a. -1.2130 0.2318 -0.0283 91.4529 7 3 
Argentina 1989, 1995 -0.0208 16.0253 0.8327 8.3333 0.1122 0.2340 -0.1514 34.3766 7 3 
Australia n.a. -0.5544. 77.9046 1.0875 0.6133 1.8120 0.1700 -0.1889 55.2965 8 2 
Austria 2008 -0.9636 98.0067 1.5348 2.5150 1.9054 0.2210 -0.0344 80.1006 8 2 
Bangladesh n.a. -1.4219 25.7188 0.6329 29.9133 -0.7749 0.0860 0.0353 64.2269 n.a. n.a. 
Barbados n.a. -0.1858 53.1697 0.9993 n.a. -0.2407 n.a. -2.0520 98.1895 n.a. n.a. 
Belarus 1995 -1.5939 9.8210 0.8185 6.0300 -0.9287 0.3825 -0.0255 94.9990 6 2 
Belgium 2008 -0.9498 69.0287 1.0681 2.4400 1.5480 0.2059 0.0269 74.1383 8 2 
Belize n.a. -0.7526 41.8510 1.4416 n.a. 0.7929 n.a. -0.0303 100 8 2 
Bolivia 1994 -0.7016 41.7397 1.1700 8.9600 -0.2890 0.2756 -0.1529 46.9582 8 4 
Botswana n.a. -1.0513 13.9197 1.1311 1.7000 0.6243 0.5089 -0.0373 98.8207 8 2 
Brazil 1990, 1994 -0.5959 32.8792 0.9106 6.5466 -0.2142 0.3751 -0.1042 39.9305 8 1 
Bulgaria 1996 -0.3712 38.1601 0.7896 6.4200 -0.1122 0.2320 -0.3344 86.9544 8 2 
Burundi 1994 -1.3335 14.1476 1.1822 n.a. -0.8774 0.2120 0.0167 88.9460 8 3 
Cameroon 1995 0.3975 11.7518 0.9542 n.a. -1.4972 n.a. -0.0217 83.4034 8 2 
Canada n.a. -1.3325 93.6822 1.3789 1.0066 1.7634 0.2133 -0.0031 39.3160 8 2 
Central African Rep 1995 1.8930 5.5362 0.6008 n.a. -0.2849 n.a. n.a. n.a. 8 2 
China 1998 0.3517 94.4337 1.2632 16.0750 -0.2514 0.3843 -0.0566 56.9261 6 4 
China, Hong Kong n.a. -1.2547 142.0347 1.2420 4.2133 1.1419 0.3494 -0.0221 47.4374 6 2 
Colombia 1998 -1.4855 26.0906 0.8877 7.9400 -0.6695 0.2629 0.0340 35.1974 8 3 
Congo Rep. 1992 -0.5744 7.5458 0.9644 n.a. n.a. 0.2742 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Costa Rica 1994 -1.1110 21.1160 1.3298 2.5667 0.5731 0.2587 -0.0803 86.8226 8 4 
Côte d’Ivoire n.a. 0.8554 20.2979 1.1540 n.a. -0.6851 0.3199 -0.0440 86.1224 8 3 
Croatia 1998 0.0701 39.6786 0.9186 8.0866 -0.5647 0.0765 -0.0329 52.2025 7 2 
Cyprus n.a. -1.2315 138.4956 3.0520 3.6000 0.7600 0.1844 0.1665 82.4479 6 3 
Czech Rep. 1996 -1.2945 48.6932 0.7921 13.1000 0.8678 0.2980 -0.0895 76.1430 8 3 
Denmark 2008 -1.3601 90.6305 1.11710 0.8083 1.8736 0.1823 -0.0761 79.9724 8 3 
Ecuador 1998 -0.6828 22.1987 0.8484 10.0200 -0.4239 0.5268 0.2338 94.4290 8 4 
Egypt, Arab Rep. n.a. -0.7991 38.2563 1.4788 19.6025 0.0770 n.a. -0.0755 55.9305 8 3 
El Salvador 1989 -0.7091 3.9972 1.3841 2.8667 -0.9087 0.0946 -0.1623 92.7750 8 4 
Estonia 1992 -0.5604 34.5449 0.9158 1.0200 0.5051 0.1647 -0.1566 84.9947 8 2 
Ethiopia n.a. 0.1553 12.6141 0.7834 n.a. -0.9423 0.2849 -0.0236 94.8891 n.a. n.a. 
Fiji n.a. -0.6190 34.5023 0.8911 n.a. 0.2167 n.a. n.a. n.a. 7 n.a. 
Finland 1991 -1.0951 68.7033 1.1411 0.7200 1.9047 0.2388 -0.1648 90.0564 6 2 
France n.a. -1.0050 88.9332 1.2670 4.8200 1.4694 0.0847 -0.0679 50.9603 6 2 
Gabon n.a. 0.3468 9.1616 1.1242 10.9275 -0.9281 n.a. -0.0357 100 8 2 
Georgia 1991 -0.8125 9.2803 1.0262 4.8000 -0.8365 0.5365 -0.0771 75.9528 n.a. n.a. 
Germany 2008 -1.4673 105.0687 1.3867 4.3066 1.7916 0.3038 -0.0422 60.8039 7 2 
Greece 2008 -1.3542 47.4952 0.7716 9.6000 0.9447 0.2724 0.0768 78.7906 7 2 
Honduras n.a. -1.2948 32.3087 1.0551 8.6333 -0.7455 0.1346 -0.0821 51.8589 8 3 
Hungary 1991, 2008 -0.8975 36.2131 0.9112 3.5200 0.8400 0.0425 -0.1106 60.8105 8 3 
Iceland 2008 -1.1509 99.7969 0.1805 1.7711 1.6368 0.3371 0.3349 100 8 2 
India 1993 -1.3295 27.8956 1.2421 10.0733 0.2942 0.2960 -0.1079 35.2846 6 3 
Indonesia 1997 -0.6614 33.5201 0.6436 26.5666 -0.3666 0.4222 0.0695 41.8002 n.a. n.a. 
Iran n.a. -0.7168 21.0447 1.1179 n.a. -0.9773 0.2604 0.0212 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Iraq n.a. 0.4069 2.2420 0.7820 n.a. -1.6104 n.a. -0.0074 91.6376 n.a. n.a. 
Ireland 2008 -0.5979 93.4710 0.8345 1.1000 1.7142 0.4161 -0.0170 74.2916 n.a. 2 
Israel n.a. -0.7423 70.6800 1.4471 5.6950 1.2208 0.2369 -0.1381 73.9618 3 3 
Italy 2008 -1.4049 68.6802 1.1695 8.4733 0.9804 0.2816 -0.0462 51.7879 8 2 
Jamaica 1996 -0.6976 20.8116 0.6753 11.000 -0.2970 0.3644 0 83.2784 n.a. n.a. 
Japan 1997 -0.7249 150.0018 1.0443 4.5533 1.5306 0.0142 -0.0244 32.5214 7 3 
Jordan 1989 -0.7705 68.0916 1.6794 11.3133 0.4439 0.3617 -0.0883 87.9472 7 3 
Kenya 1992 -0.5064 22.6883 0.9901 24.0167 -1.0563 0.0154 -0.1228 55.5506 7 3 
Kuwait n.a. -0.4676 42.9515 1.4448 8.8200 0.7376 0.1779 -0.2044 68.0861 6 2 
Kyrgyz Rep. 1995 -1.1001 6.1315 1.2759 5.0333 -0.6406 0.9548 -0.0542 83.3545 8 2 
Latvia 2008 -0.9802 33.8080 0.6321 3.5667 0.1312 0.2443 0.1112 48.3698 8 2 
Lithuania 1995 0.7805 22.9431 0.5605 7.5800 0.2943 0.4347 0.2328 82.7638 8 2 
Luxembourg 2008 -1.0262 110.8394 1.3740 0.4266 1.6092 0.1279 -0.0412 27.7970 8 3 
Madagascar n.a. -1.2781 10.6793 0.8309 8.6000 -0.9717 0.2800 -0.0074 88.0090 7 3 
Malawi n.a. -0.3072 6.2054 0.9942 n.a. -0.5540 0.5663 -0.0912 93.4230 n.a. n.a. 
Malaysia 1997 -1.0610 108.8048 1.2948 14.2333 0.7308 0.2685 -0.0161 42.6060 7 3 
Malta n.a. -0.6684 94.9482 1.1748 9.4700 0.4303 0.4190 -0.0750 94.7468 8 3 
Mauritius n.a. -1.1176 50.9256 1.1398 6.7166 0.7588 0.2236 -0.1508 88.1370 7 2 
Mexico 1994 -0.6719 18.8047 1.0671 6.2866 -0.5064 0.2520 -0.3157 68.2782 8 3 
Mongolia 2008 -0.1578 13.4382 1.4422 n.a. 0.0684 0.3654 -0.0678 96.2425 n.a. n.a. 





Nepal n.a. -0.9592 22.3028 1.0727 n.a. n.a. 0.4537 -0.0846 75.3321 n.a. n.a. 
Netherlands 2008 -1.3744 118.2334 1.3510 2.1466 1.8128 0.3014 -0.0657 82.7982 8 1 
New Zealand n.a. -0.9174 98.9654 1.2899 n.a. 1.9678 0.2061 -0.8247 100 6 1 
Niger n.a. 0.7209 7.5330 1.1094 n.a. -0.8860 0.0618 -0.0263 91.7854 8 3 
Nigeria n.a. -0.0947 12.2506 0.7063 17.7533 -1.3500 0.2020 -0.1103 33.0847 8 3 
Norway 1991 -0.7475 65.0625 0.9856 1.2000 2.0251 0.1437 -0.0848 85.2153 8 2 
Oman n.a. -0.3395 34.0696 1.1945 7.1516 0.8690 0.1791 -0.0591 58.1995 8 3 
Pakistan n.a. -1.8706 23.5839 0.9077 16.4066 -0.5911 0.3499 -0.2042 65.9154 7 3 
Panama n.a. -1.5988 68.1749 1.4081 2.0950 -0.1548 0.1192 -0.0438 32.1999 8 2 
Paraguay 1995 -1.6272 21.7426 1.1764 9.7416 -0.4610 0.4303 -0.3171 44.7598 7 2 
Peru n.a. -1.0660 16.0945 1.2531 7.3283 -0.5796 0.3141 -0.0714 59.1234 7 2 
Philippines n.a. -0.9944 28.8389 1.4854 13.4133 -0.0246 0.4347 -0.0718 76.3924 8 2 
Poland 1992 -0.4998 23.5731 0.9675 12.2916 0.6398 0.3708 -0.1397 60.0263 7 1 
Portugal 2008 -1.0823 97.3599 1.2885 2.6916 1.1366 0.3768 -0.0590 51.8338 7 3 
Qatar n.a. -0.4818 27.5282 1.6310 n.a. 0.1035 0.2896 -0.0171 92.5370 4 3 
Rep. of Korea 1997 -0.7551 66.2643 0.9555 4.5533 0.6964 0.3194 2.2074 65.6183 8 3 
Rep. of Moldova n.a. -0.8792 n.a. 1.1715 n.a. -0.1030 0.3242 n.a. n.a. 8 2 
Romania  1990 -0.6768 12.9461 0.7950 5.8200 -0.1535 0.1851 -0.2679 83.4536 8 3 
Russian Fed. 1998, 2008 -0.6405 16.5706 0.7205 9.2666 -0.7285 0.0252 -0.0840 61.7168 7 2 
Saint Lucia n.a. -0.0476 67.0291 1.1135 n.a. -0.3314 n.a. -0.0436 100 8 2 
Senegal n.a. -0.3027 20.2053 1.2003 16.1925 -0.3885 0.0199 -0.0465 75.4049 8 3 
Serbia n.a. -0.5156 25.0071 1.1281 18.4083 -0.9848 0.2360 -0.0944 92.5099 7 2 
Singapore n.a. -0.9977 90.9672 1.4352 4.5900 1.7379 0.3350 0.8436 75.0449 8 4 
Slovak Rep. 1998 -0.6871 40.8661 0.9006 15.7200 0.2268 0.2591 0.4054 64.3816 8 3 
Slovenia 1992, 2008 -1.0900 34.5603 1.0576 4.4861 0.8662 0.0468 -0.0444 60.7522 7 3 
South Africa n.a. -1.3614 60.5318 1.3518 3.1416 0.2611 0.2514 -0.0231 81.4810 6 2 
Spain 2008 -1.2821 99.6392 1.4111 1.4733 1.3542 0.3754 -0.0578 75.0458 8 1 
Sri Lanka 1989 -0.7049 23.0053 1.0905 n.a. -0.1195 0.2629 -0.07353 77.8773 8 3 
Swaziland 1995 -1.2277 15.6046 0.6764 4.7000 0.7929 0.1109 -0.3629 100 7 4 
Sweden 1991 -0.5604 65.7767 1.0519 1.6933 1.8365 0.0901 -0.0329 94.4365 8 1 
Switzerland 2008 -1.6959 154.6156 1.1334 2.8666 2.0804 0.3481 -0.0619 86.2603 8 2 
Syrian Arab. Rep. n.a. -0.7434 9.2433 0.5898 n.a. -0.4874 n.a. -0.0785 91.2484 n.a. n.a. 
Thailand n.a. -0.4158 106.5131 -0.1325 23.6666 0.5820 0.4524 -0.1115 48.4175 8 3 
The Yugosl. Rep. Macedonia 1993 0.1831 n.a. 1.1303 n.a. -0.1540 0.3405 n.a. n.a. 8 2 
Trinidad and Tobago n.a. -0.8439 28.7996 1.2154 n.a. 0.5360 0.2735 -0.0975 71.7196 3 2 
Tunisia 1991 -1.0038 53.1517 1.4652 21.0500 -0.2020 0.3379 0.0179 46.3998 8 3 
Turkey n.a. -1.1757 16.0700 0.6402 8.6066 -0.0128 0.1613 0.3588 55.4169 7 2 
Uganda 1994 -0.9390 5.2084 0.8499 10.2066 -0.6416 n.a. -0.0353 54.9132 n.a. n.a. 
United Kingdom 2007 -1.4393 126.6779 1.0945 2.3666 1.8279 0.2870 -0.0561 61.5912 8 1 
United Rep. of Tanzania n.a. -1.0388 5.9572 0.9088 24.0500 -0.4229 0.4678 0 100 n.a. n.a. 
Uruguay 2002 -0.8602 30.2029 0.3500 10.2725 0.5571 0.1063 -0.2252 48.3848 7 4 
Vietnam 1997 -0.9394 39.8182 1.2444 n.a. -0.6483 0.3017 -0.0559 84.7007 n.a. n.a. 
Yemen, Rep. 1996 -1.1227 4.9534 1.0921 n.a. -1.1471 n.a. -0.0149 95.1194 n.a. n.a. 







Table 2. Descriptive Statistics. Industry-Level Information 
 
This table shows the mean values of the industry-level variables. Volatility VA is the standard deviation (relative) of the industrial value added (in 
natural logarithms).  ED is the measure of external financial dependence calculated in Rajan and Zingales (1998). INTAN is the ratio intangible assets-
to-net fixed assets calculated in Claessens and Laeven (2003) for US data. The sample consists of 23 industrial sectors from 110 developed and 
developing countries analyzed during the 1989 – 2008 period. Industrial information on value added comes from the UNIDO database.  
 
Industry (ISIC Classification) ISIC-Code Volatility VA (Log.) ED INTAN 
Basic Metals 27 -0.7711 0.09 0.11 
Chemicals and Chemical Products 24 -0.8092 0.63 0.96 
Coke, Petroleum, and Nuclear 23 -0.6655 0.04 0.02 
Electrical Machinery and Apparatus 31 -0.8260 0.77 0.77 
Fabricated Metal Products 28 -0.8873 0.24 0.31 
Food and Beverages 15 -0.8930 0.11 0.75 
Furniture; Manufacturing n.e.c. 36 -0.8004 0.24 0.49 
Leather 19 -1.0550 -0.14 0.33 
Machinery and Equipment 29 -0.8474 0.45 0.25 
Medical, Precision and Optical Instruments, Watches and Clocks 33 -0.8180 0.96 0.90 
Motor Vehicles, Trailers and Semi-Trailers 34 -0.7768 0.39 0.24 
Office, Accounting, and Computing Machinery 30 -0.6849 1.06 0.25 
Other Non-Metallic Mineral Products 26 -0.8446 0.06 0.05 
Other Transport Equipment 35 -0.9480 0.31 0.24 
Paper and Paper Products 21 -0.8810 0.18 0.20 
Publishing, Printing, and Reproduction 22 -0.7978 0.20 4.54 
Radio, television and Communication Equipment and Apparatus 32 -0.8504 1.04 0.77 
Recycling 37 -0.8075 0.47 2.29 
Rubber and Plastic Products 25 -0.9027 0.68 0.46 
Textiles 17 -0.8863 0.40 0.21 
Tobacco 16 -0.7929 -0.45 0.49 
Wearing  18 -0.8761 0.03 0.53 
Wood and Wood Products 20 -0.8361 0.28 1.20 






Table 3. Correlations 
 
The table presents the correlation matrix.  Volatility VA is the standard deviation (relative) of the industrial value added (in natural logarithms).  FD is a measure of 
financial development and is defined as the ratio of bank private credit from commercial banks-to-GDP. ZSCORE is the natural logarithm of bank Z-score, a proxy 
for insolvency risk that equals the return on assets plus the capital asset ratio divided by the standard deviation of asset returns. NPL is the percentage of non-
performing loans over total gross loans. LAW is the rule of law index.   LERNER is the Lerner index. BOONE is the Boone indicator. LERNER and BOONE are 
proxies for bank market power. CONC is bank concentration, measured as the fraction of the assets of the three largest banks as a share of the assets of all 
commercial banks in a country. ENTRY is an index that measures the legal restrictions to entry into the banking industry. RESTOWN measures the legal 
restrictions on bank ownership and control by non-financial firms. The sample consists of 110 developed and developing countries during the 1989– 2008 period. 
Industrial information comes from the UNIDO database. Country-level financial information is collected from the World Bank Statistics Database. Information on 
institutional variables is from The World Bank Institute’s Governance Group.  Regulatory variables come from the Barth et al. (2006) database. ***, and ** 





FD (%) ZSCORE NPL (%) LAW LERNER BOONE CONC ENTRY RESTOWN 
Volatility VA 
(Log.) 
1.0000          
FD (%) -0.1913*** 1.0000         
Z-SCORE -0.1191*** 0.1438*** 1.0000        
NPL (%) 0.1838*** -0.2791*** -0.2743*** 1.0000       
LAW -0.2271*** 0.7246*** 0.1083*** -0.4763*** 1.0000      
LERNER -0.0182 -0.1508*** 0.0372 0.1317*** -0.1903*** 1.0000    
BOONE -0.0284** 0.0700*** 0.0150 -0.0132 0.0760*** -0.0706*** 1.0000   
CONC 0.0972*** -0.2354*** -0.0237** -0.0579*** -0.1525*** 0.3021*** 0.0502*** 1.0000   
ENTRY -0.0168 -0.1517*** -0.0788*** 0.1116*** -0.1859*** -0.0151 0.0096 0.0627*** 1.0000  






BankingStability, Financial Development, and Economic Volatility 
 
This table shows results of regressions analyzing the effect of banking stability on industrial economic volatility after controlling for financial development. 
Regressions are estimated using instrumental variables and OLS for cross-country data at industry-level. PANEL A presents the results using the ZSCORE as a 
proxy for banking stability. PANEL B presents the results using the ratio of non-performing loans-to-gross loans (NPL)  proxying for (in)stability of the banking 
system. The dependent variable is the adjusted standard deviation of industrial value added. ISHARE is the initial share of value added for each industry.  ED is the 
measure of external financial dependence calculated in Rajan and Zingales (1998). FD is a measure of financial development and is defined as the ratio of bank 
private credit from commercial banks-to-GDP.  INTAN is the ratio of intangible assets-to-net fixed assets calculated in Claessens and Laeven (2003) for US data. 
LAW is an index measuring the rule of law of each country. The Durbin-Wu-Hausman statistic tests the null hypothesis that the use of instruments for country-level 
variables does not change the estimation outcome. We report IV estimates when the test is rejected at the one percent level. The instruments used are: legal origin 
dummy variables (English, French, German and Scandinavian) and time dummies. Standard errors are clustered by country and industry. T-statistics are between 




PANEL A: Using ZSCORE 
 
PANEL B: Using NPL 
 (1) 
 
(2) (3) (4) (5) 
 










































































Country-Industry Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country-Period Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-Period Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-Squared 0.0266  0.0165 0.0324 0.0563 0.0363  0.0268 0.0504 0.0626 0.0473 
F-Test 17.20***  12.13*** 17.25*** 28.49*** 18.97***  10.52*** 18.04*** 15.50*** 15.13*** 
# Observations 4,620  4,856 4,520 4,481 4,481  2,964 2,786 2,786 2,786 












Banking Stability, Bank Market Competition, and Ownership relationships 
 
This table shows the results of regressions analyzing the effect of banking stability on industrial economic volatility by subsamples of countries around the median values 
of country variables.  Regressions are estimated using instrumental variables and OLS for cross-country data at industry-level.  PANEL A presents the results using the 
ZSCORE as a proxy for banking stability. PANEL B presents the estimations using the ratio of non-performing loans-to-gross loans (NPL) proxying for instability of the 
banking system. The dependent variable is the adjusted standard deviation of industrial value added. ISHARE is the initial share of value added for each industry.  ED is 
the measure of external financial dependence calculated in Rajan and Zingales (1998). FD is a measure of financial development and is defined as the ratio of bank 
private credit from commercial banks-to-GDP. INTAN is the ratio of intangible assets-to-net fixed assets calculated in Claessens and Laeven (2003) for US data. LAW is 
an index measuring the rule of law of each country. LERNER is the Lerner index. BOONE is the Boone indicator. CONC is bank concentration, measured as the fraction 
of the assets of the three largest banks as a share of the assets of all commercial banks in a country. ENTRY is an index that measures the legal restrictions to entry into 
the banking industry. RESTOWN measures the legal restrictions on bank ownership and control by non-financial firms.  The Durbin-Wu-Hausman statistic tests the null 
hypothesis that the use of instruments for country-level variables does not change the estimation outcome. We report IV estimates when the test is rejected at the one 
percent level. The instruments used are: legal origin dummy variables (English, French, German and Scandinavian) and time dummies. Standard errors are clustered by 
country and industry. T-statistics are between parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 
 PANEL A: Using ZSCORE 




















































































































Country-Industry Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Country-Period Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Industry-Period Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
R-Squared 0.0700 0.0213  0.0412 0.0639  0.0775 0.0314  0.0853 0.0536  0.0301 0.0819 
F-Test 17.41*** 5.19***  10.50*** 20.53***  22.92*** 9.19***  28.05*** 9.30***  10.10*** 23.62*** 
# Observations 2,331 2,150  2,224 2,257  2,259 2,222  2,815 1,666  2.435 2,046 
DHW Test 29.82*** 16.82***  2.89** 34.64***  11.84*** 6.88***  1.75 21.82***  15.73*** 33.57*** 
PANEL B: Using NPL 




















































































































Country-Industry Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Country-Period Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Industry-Period Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
R-Squared 0.1015 0.0183  0.0885 0.0246  0.0590 0.1268  0.0713 0.1114  0.0378 0.0649 
F-Test 14.15*** 3.19***  12.99*** 4.02***  12.20*** 18.97***  21.44*** 15.48***  7.26*** 22.75*** 
# Observations 1,412 1,374  1,387 1,399  1,383 1,403  1,706 1,080  1,347 1,439 
DHW Test 7.49*** 3.24**  34.84*** 33.36***  1.65 18.82***  2.60* 31.33***  38.49*** 12.04*** 
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Table 6. Systemic Banking Crises and Economic Volatility 
This table shows the results of regressions analyzing the effect of banking stability on industrial economic volatility using a CRISIS dummy 
variable as an alternative proxy for banking stability. In Panel A we use the CRISIS dummy variable that takesvalue 1 in the period in which 
the country has experienced a banking crisis and the following periods. Otherwise, it takes value 0. In Panel B we use the CRISIS dummy 
variable that takesvalue1 in the period in which the country has experienced a banking crisis, and 0 otherwise. Regressions are estimated 
using OLS or instrumental variables for cross-country data at industry-level. The dependent variable is the adjusted standard deviation of 
industrial value added. ISHARE is the initial share of value added for each industry. ED is the measure of external financial dependence 
calculated in Rajan and Zingales (1998). FD is a measure of financial development and is defined as the ratio of bank private credit from 
commercial banks-to-GDP.   INTAN is the ratio of intangible assets-to-net fixed assets calculated in Claessens and Laeven (2003) for US 
data. LAW is the country’s rule of law. The Durbin-Wu-Hausman statistic tests the null hypothesis that the use of instruments for country-
level variables does not change the estimation outcome. We report IV estimates when the test is rejected at the one percent level.  The 
instruments used are: legal origin dummy variables and time dummies.Country-industry, country-period, and industry-period dummy 










 PANEL A: Crisis & Post-Crisis Periods PANEL B: Crisis Periods 









































    
0.8421** 
(2.22) 
   























Country-Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country-Period Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-Period Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-Squared 0.0353 0.0330 0.0346 0.0306  0.0288 0.0293 0.0274 0.0292 
F-Test 20.79*** 15.89*** 19.96*** 16.63***  16.19*** 13.50*** 15.22*** 15.43*** 
# Observations 4,612 4,573 4,612 4,573  4,573 4,573 4,573 4,573 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman Test 12.46*** 12.29*** 15.65*** 12.37***  8.72*** 6.58*** 9.14*** 10.18*** 
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Table 7.Banking Stability, Financial Development, and Economic Volatility: Real & Monetary Shocks 
 
This table shows the effect of banking stability on economic volatility following the approach suggested in Beck et al. (2006).  Regressions are 
estimated using OLS or instrumental variables for cross-country data at industry-level. The dependent variable is the adjusted standard deviation of 
industrial value added. ISHARE is the initial share of value added for each industry. FD is a measure of financial development and is defined as the 
ratio of private credit from commercial banks-to-GDP. SD_TOT and SD_INF are the adjusted standard deviation of terms of trade and the adjusted 
standard deviation of inflation, respectively.  INTAN is the ratio of intangible assets-to-net fixed assets calculated in Claessens and Laeven (2003) for 
US data. ED is the measure of external financial dependence calculated in Rajan and Zingales (1998).  LAW is the measure of institutional quality. 
The Durbin-Wu-Hausman statistic tests the null hypothesis that the use of instruments for country-level variables does not change the estimation 
outcome. We report IV estimates when the test is rejected at the one percent level.  The instruments used are: legal origin dummy variables (English, 
French, German and Scandinavian) and time dummies.Country-industry, country-period, and industry-period dummy variables are included but are 
































      































   
SD_TOT  * ED * FD       
-0.0019 
(-1.64) 














Country-Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country-Period Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-Period Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-Squared 0.1077 0.0340 0.0916 0.0937 0.0636 0.0617 0.0401 
F-Test 22.93*** 9.46*** 24.55*** 21.39*** 15.95*** 14.78*** 9.58*** 
# Observations 1,653 1,653 1,604 1,604 1,552 1,552 1,653 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman Test 7.98*** 2.60* 10.67*** 10.67*** 7.50*** 7.21*** 8.87*** 
